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Abstract
Differentially private machine learning trains models while protecting privacy of the
sensitive training data. The key to obtain differentially private models is to introduce
noise/randomness to the training process. In particular, existing differentially private
machine learning methods add noise to the training data, the gradients, the loss func-
tion, and/or the model itself. Bagging, a popular ensemble learning framework, randomly
creates some subsamples of the training data, trains a base model for each subsample
using a base learner, and takes majority vote among the base models when making pre-
dictions. Bagging has intrinsic randomness in the training process as it randomly creates
subsamples. Our major theoretical results show that such intrinsic randomness already
makes Bagging differentially private without the needs of additional noise. In particu-
lar, we prove that, for any base learner, Bagging with and without replacement respec-
tively achieves
(
N · k · ln n+1n , 1− (n−1n )N ·k
)
-differential privacy and
(
ln n+1n+1−N ·k ,
N ·k
n
)
-
differential privacy, where n is the training data size, k is the subsample size, and N
is the number of base models. Moreover, we prove that if no assumptions about the
base learner are made, our derived privacy guarantees are tight. We empirically evaluate
Bagging on MNIST and CIFAR10. Our experimental results demonstrate that Bagging
achieves significantly higher accuracies than state-of-the-art differentially private machine
learning methods with the same privacy budgets.
1 Introduction
Machine learning has transformed various areas such as computer vision, natural language
processing, healthcare, and cybersecurity. However, since a model is essentially some aggre-
gate of the training data, the model may reveal rich information about the training data. For
instance, with access to a model or only its prediction API, model inversion [8] can recon-
struct (representative) training data of the model, while membership inference [18] can predict
whether a given data point is among the model’s training data or not. As a result, the model
may compromise the privacy or confidentiality of the sensitive or proprietary training data
such as electronic health records, location traces, and online digital behaviors. Moreover, var-
ious countries have passed laws such as General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [21] to
regulate and protect data privacy. Therefore, privacy-preserving machine learning that trains
models while protecting privacy of the training data is gaining increasing attention in both
academia and industry.
(, δ)-differential privacy [7] has become a de facto standard for privacy-preserving data
analytics. Many studies [10, 1, 16, 17, 11, 24] have extended (, δ)-differential privacy to ma-
chine learning. Roughly speaking, a machine learning method satisfies differential privacy if the
learnt model does not change much when adding or removing one example in the training data.
The key idea of differentially private machine learning is to introduce noise/randomness in the
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training process. Specifically, existing methods introduce randomness to the training data, the
gradients when stochastic gradient descent is used to learn a model, the loss function, and/or
the model itself. For instance, Differentially Private Stochastic Gradient Descent (DPSGD) [1]
introduces well-calibrated Gaussian noise to the gradient computed from a random batch of
the training data in each iteration when using stochastic gradient descent to learn a model.
Private Aggregation of Teacher Ensembles (PATE) [16, 17] trains multiple teacher models on
pre-defined disjoint chunks of the sensitive training data. Then, PATE uses the teacher models
to predict labels for some examples in a non-sensitive public dataset, aggregates the labels for
each example, and adds noise to the aggregated labels to achieve differential privacy. Finally,
PATE trains a student model using the non-sensitive public dataset with the aggregated labels
predicted by the teacher models. The student model satisfies (, δ)-differential privacy.
Our work: Bagging [3], a popular ensemble learning framework, randomly creates some sub-
samples of the training data, trains a base model for each subsample using a base learner, and
takes majority vote among the base models when making predictions. Bagging has intrinsic
randomness in the training process as it randomly creates subsamples. Our major theoretical
results have two folds. On one hand, we show that the intrinsic randomness of Bagging al-
ready makes it differentially private without the needs of additional noise. In particular, we
prove that, for any base learner, Bagging with and without replacement respectively achieves(
N · k · ln n+1n , 1− (n−1n )N ·k
)
-differential privacy and
(
N · ln n+1n+1−N ·k , N ·kn
)
-differential privacy,
where n is the training data size, k is the subsample size, and N is the number of base models.
Moreover, we prove that if no assumptions about the base learner are made, our derived privacy
guarantees are tight. On the other hand, our theoretical results indicate that Bagging can only
provide differential privacy with δ ≥ 1/n. According to Dwork and Roth [7], δ ≥ 1/n provides
“just a few” privacy guarantee, which is equivalent to protecting the privacy of most training
examples while compromising the privacy of just a few training examples. We empirically
evaluate Bagging on MNIST and CIFAR10. For instance, Bagging achieves 79.55% testing
accuracy on CIFAR10 with privacy budget  = 0.2, δ = 0.18 (i.e., k = 10000 and N = 1).
With the same privacy budget, DPSGD [1] only achieves 30.63% testing accuracy.
Our main contributions can be summarized as follows:
• We derive the intrinsic (, δ)-differential privacy of Bagging.
• We prove our derived (, δ)-differential privacy of Bagging is tight if no extra assumptions
about the base learner are given.
• We empirically compare Bagging with state-of-the-art privacy-preserving machine learn-
ing methods on MNIST and CIFAR10.
2 Background and Related Work
In this section, we first review the concept of (, δ)-differential privacy as well as its composition
theorem and post-processing property. Then, we review Bagging [3] and existing differentially
private machine learning approaches.
2.1 Differential Privacy
Differential privacy [7] is defined in terms of adjacent datasets. In machine learning, a dataset
consists of training examples. We call two training datasets adjacent datasets if there only
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exists one training example that appears in one dataset but is absent in the other. With the
definition of adjacent datasets, we can introduce the definition of (, δ)-differential privacy as
follows:
Definition 1 ((, δ)-differential privacy [7]). A randomized mechanism M : D → R satisfies
(, δ)-differential privacy if for all adjacent datasets D, D′ ∈ D, and for all S ⊆ R, it holds
that:
Pr(M(D) ∈ S) ≤ e · Pr(M(D′) ∈ S) + δ, (1)
where the randomness is taking over the mechanism M.
In machine learning, the randomized mechanismM denotes the algorithm to train a model.
(, δ)-differential privacy formalizes that the learnt model does not change much when adding
or removing an arbitrary example in the training data.  and δ quantify the upper bound of
observable probability differences between the learnt models conditioned on adjacent datasets.
If δ = 0, we say thatM is -differentially private [7]. Thereby, the additive term δ is considered
as the probability at which the -differential privacy guarantee may be broken.
When several differential privacy mechanisms are composed, the differential privacy guar-
antee of the composed mechanism is the sum of the privacy guarantees of the individual mech-
anisms. Formally, differential privacy follows the following standard composition theorem [7]:
Theorem 1 (Composition theorem of (, δ)-differential privacy [7]). Let Mi : D → Ri be
an (i, δi)-differentially private algorithm for i ∈ [k]. If M[k] : D →
∏k
i=1Ri is defined to be
M[k](D) = (M1(D), · · · ,Mk(D)) , then M[k] satisfies
(∑k
i=1 i,
∑k
i=1 δi
)
-differential privacy.
Proof. Please refer to the proof of Theorem 3.16 in Dwork and Roth [7]
The composition theorem is a standard way to obtain privacy guarantees for repeated appli-
cation of differentially private algorithms. Besides the composition theorem, (, δ)-differential
privacy also has the following post-processing property:
Proposition 1 (Post-processing [7]). LetM : D → R be a randomized algorithm that is (, δ)-
differentially private. If f : R → R′ is an arbitrary randomized or deterministic mapping.
Then f ◦M : D → R′ satisfies (, δ)-differential privacy.
Proof. Please refer to the proof of Proposition 2.1 in Dwork and Roth [7].
The post-processing property ensures that the computation results of a differentially private
mechanism can be safely released because any post-processing computation of originally (, δ)-
differentially private algorithm will also be (, δ)-differentially private. The composition theo-
rem and post-processing property make (, δ)-differential privacy applicable to analyze/design
complex differentially private algorithms.
2.2 Bagging
Ensemble learning [6] tries to combine the base models produced by several learners into an
ensemble that performs better than the original base learners. Bagging is a popular ensemble
learning framework [3], which we formally define as follows:
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Definition 2 (Bagging (Bootstrap Aggregating) [3]). Given a training dataset D of size n,
Bagging generates N subsamples Di (i = 1, 2, · · · , N). Each subsample Di randomly samples
k examples from D with or without replacement. Then, Bagging trains a base model on each
subsample Di using a base learner. When predicting the label for a testing example, Bagging
takes majority vote among the base models.
If Bagging creates a subsample by randomly sampling k examples from the training dataset
with replacement, some examples in the training dataset may be chosen multiple times. If
Bagging creates a subsample by randomly sampling k examples from the training dataset
without replacement, an example in the training dataset may be selected at most once. In the
following parts of this paper, we distinguish these two methods as Bagging with replacement
and Bagging without replacement, respectively. In Section 3, our major theoretical results
show that Bagging’s intrinsic randomness brought by its re-sampling process already satisfies
(, δ)-differential privacy.
2.3 Differentially Private Machine Learning
Many studies [10, 1, 16, 17, 11, 24, 4, 13, 20, 2, 22, 11] have extended (, δ)-differential privacy to
machine learning. Generally speaking, most studies satisfy differential privacy by introducing
additive-noise mechanisms. Specifically, existing methods introduce noise/randomness to the
training data, the gradients when stochastic gradient descent is used to learn a model, the loss
function, and/or the model itself. For instance, Chaudhuri et al. [4] proposed to add noise
to the loss function and then minimize the noisy loss function using a standard optimization
method. Kifer et al. [13] improved the utility of such loss function based perturbation method.
Several other methods [20, 2, 1, 22] proposed to add noise to the gradient in each iteration
of gradient descent or stochastic gradient descent. For instance, Abadi et al. [1] proposed
DPSGD, which introduces well-calibrated Gaussian noise to the gradient computed from a
random batch of the training data in each iteration when using stochastic gradient descent to
learn a model. Moreover, they proposed moments accountant, which is a stronger accounting
method to track the privacy loss for adding Gaussian noise than the standard composition
theorem. Jordan et al. [11] proposed a method for the generator in generative adversarial
networks [9] to generate synthetic data for training, which provides privacy guarantee for the
original training dataset. Papernot et al. [16, 17] developed the PATE [16, 17] framework,
which trains multiple teacher models on pre-defined disjoint chunks of the sensitive training
data and distills the teacher models to a student model using public non-sensitive data in
a privacy-preserving way. The student model satisfies (, δ)-differential privacy. Jordan et
al. [12] introduced a variant of PATE to improve the student model’s accuracy by dividing
the sensitive data several times (rather than just once in PATE) and learning teacher models
on each chunk within each division. Note that PATE and its variant [12] divide the sensitive
training data to chunks, which is different from Bagging that randomly creates subsamples.
Moreover, our results essentially show that if PATE trains the teacher models using randomly
created subsamples, then the teacher models (they can be treated as base models in Bagging)
already satisfy (, δ)-differential privacy.
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Table 1: Our derived tight (, δ)-differential privacy guarantees for Bagging. n is
the training dataset size, k is the subsample size, and N is the number of base
models.
 δ
Bagging with replacement N · k · ln n+1n 1− (n−1n )N ·k
Bagging without replacement ln n+1n+1−N ·k
N ·k
n
3 (, δ)-Differential Privacy of Bagging
In this section, we first intuitively explain why the randomness of the re-sampling process in
Bagging may satisfy differential privacy. Then, we formally derive the (, δ)-differential privacy
of Bagging in different cases and prove the tightness of our derived privacy guarantee bounds.
Due to the space limitation, we put our detailed proofs in the Supplementary Material.
Roughly speaking, a machine learning method satisfies differential privacy if the learnt
model does not change much when adding or removing one example in the training data.
Suppose Bagging randomly samples k examples with replacement from the training dataset
to create one subsample and trains one base model. When the size of the training dataset
is large, Bagging is unlikely to sample the example, which is added or removed from the
original training dataset. Specifically, when the size of the training dataset is n, Bagging with
replacement would not select that added or removed example with probability of
(
n−1
n
)k
when
creating a subsample. Therefore, adding or removing one example in the training dataset
is unlikely to substantially affect the base model, making Bagging differentially private. In
the following, we formally analyze the (, δ)-differential privacy guarantees of Bagging. Table
1 summarizes our derived (, δ)-differential privacy guarantees for Bagging with and without
replacement.
Theorem 2 ((, δ)-differential privacy of Bagging with replacement when N = 1). Given a
training dataset of size n and an arbitrary base learner, Bagging with replacement achieves (k ·
ln n+1n , 1− (n−1n )k)-differential privacy when training one base model, where k is the subsample
size.
Proof. Please refer to Appendix A in Supplementary Material.
Note that our results are applicable to any base learner. One way to obtain the differential
privacy guarantee of Bagging when training N base models is to apply the standard compo-
sition theorem in Theorem 1. In particular, based on the standard composition theorem of
(, δ)-differential privacy, Bagging with replacement achieves
(
N · k · ln n+1n , N ·
(
1− (n−1n )k
))
-
differential privacy when training N base models. However, this differential privacy guarantee
from the standard composition theorem is loose. In the following theorem, we show that Bag-
ging with N base models achieves better differential privacy guarantees than that indicated by
the standard composition theorem.
Theorem 3 ((, δ)-differential privacy of Bagging with replacement when N>1). Given a
training dataset of size n and an arbitrary base learner, Bagging with replacement achieves
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(N · k · ln n+1n , 1− (n−1n )N ·k)-differential privacy when training N base models, where k is the
subsample size.
Proof. We first sample N · k examples from the training dataset uniformly at randomly
with replacement. Based on the proof of Theorem 2, the sampled N · k examples achieve(
N · k · ln n+1n , 1− (n−1n )N ·k
)
-differential privacy. Then, we can evenly divide the N · k exam-
ples to N subsamples and train N base models. Note that we can view training the N base
models as post-processing of the N · k examples, which does not incur extra privacy loss based
on Proposition 1. Therefore, the entire process achieves (N ·k · ln n+1n , 1−(n−1n )N ·k)-differential
privacy.
If Bagging randomly samples k examples from the training dataset without replacement to
create each subsample, then Bagging has the following differential privacy guarantee:
Theorem 4 ((, δ)-differential privacy of Bagging without replacement). Given a training
dataset of size n and an arbitrary base learner, Bagging without replacement achieves (ln n+1n+1−N ·k ,
N ·k
n )-differential privacy when training N base models, where k is the subsample size.
Proof. Please see Appendix B in Supplementary Material.
Next, we show that our derived privacy guarantees of Bagging are tight if no extra assump-
tions are made on the base learner. More specifically, if no assumptions on the base learner
are made, it is impossible to derive a δ that is smaller than ours for Bagging.
Theorem 5 (Tightness of δ for Bagging with replacement). For any δ < 1− (n−1n )N ·k, there
exists a base learner such that Bagging with replacement cannot satisfy (, δ)-differential privacy
for any .
Proof. Our proof is based on constructing a counter-example base leaner that Bagging with
replacement cannot achieve (, δ)-differential privacy for any  when δ < 1 − (n−1n )N ·k. See
Appendix C in Supplementary Material for more details.
Theorem 6 (Tightness of δ for Bagging without replacement). For any δ < N ·kn , there exists
a base learner such that Bagging without replacement cannot satisfy (, δ)-differential privacy
for any .
Proof. Please see Appendix D in Supplementary Material.
4 Evaluation
We compare Bagging with DPSGD [1] and PATE [17] in different scenarios. We use the
open-source implementations of DPSGD and PATE from their authors.
4.1 Experimental Setup
Two cases: Privacy-preserving machine learning aims to train a model while protecting
the privacy of a sensitive training dataset. Depending on whether we have access to a public
non-sensitive dataset, we consider the following two cases.
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• Case I: No access to a public non-sensitive dataset. In this case, we only have
access to the sensitive training dataset. In this case, PATE is not applicable. Therefore,
we compare Bagging and DPSGD in this case.
• Case II: Access to a public non-sensitive dataset. In this case, we have access
to a public non-sensitive dataset other than the sensitive training dataset. For instance,
the sensitive training dataset could be CIFAR10 while the public non-sensitive dataset
could be ImageNet. Therefore, we can leverage transfer learning to distill knowledge
from the public non-sensitive dataset to boost the accuracy of the privacy-preserving
model trained on the sensitive training dataset. In particular, we can first pretrain a
model on the public dataset. Then, for DPSGD, we fine-tune the pretrained model on
the sensitive training dataset using DPSGD. For Bagging, we fine-tune the pretrained
model on subsamples of the sensitive training dataset to obtain the base models. For
PATE, we train the teacher models and student model via fine tuning the pretrained
model. Note that DPSGD and Bagging do not require the public non-sensitive dataset
to have the same distribution as the sensitive training dataset. However, PATE further
requires a public dataset that has the same distribution as the sensitive training dataset
to train the student model. We call this public dataset same-distribution public dataset.
Therefore, PATE has stronger assumptions than DPSGD and Bagging.
Datasets and models: We discuss our datasets and models for Case I and Case II
separately.
• Case I: We adopt MNIST [15] and CIFAR10 [14] as the sensitive training datasets. On
MNIST, we use a simple convolutional neural network with two convolutional layers,
each followed by a pooling layer, and a fully connected layer (Table 6 in Supplemental
Material shows the details). For CIFAR10, we adopt the VGG16 [19] architecture.
• Case II: We still adopt MNIST and CIFAR10 as the sensitive training datasets. When
MNIST is the sensitive training dataset, we adopt Fashion-MNIST [23] as the pub-
lic non-sensitive dataset. When CIFAR10 is the sensitive training dataset, we assume
ImageNet [5] is the public non-sensitive dataset. PATE further requires a small same-
distribution public dataset. For this purpose, we select the first 1,000 testing examples
of MNIST (or CIFAR10) as the same-distribution public dataset when training PATE’s
student models on MNIST (or CIFAR10). Note that DPSGD, Bagging, and PATE are all
evaluated on the remaining 9,000 testing examples of MNIST (or CIFAR10) in Case II.
On Fashion-MNIST, we pretrained a convolutional neural network, which has the same
architecture as the model in Case I for MNIST. Moreover, we adopt the pretrained
VGG16 model1 [19] for the ImageNet dataset. DPSGD, PATE, and Bagging fine-tune
these pretrained models on the sensitive training dataset following the standard fine-
tuning procedure. In particular, we replace the last fully connected layer of a pretrained
model as a new one that has the same number of classes as the sensitive training dataset.
We then fine-tune the model using a learning rate that is 10 times smaller than that
when training from scratch.
Parameter settings: We set training epochs=100 for both Bagging and DPSGD in both
Case I and Case II. We adopt Bagging with replacement and N = 1 as the default setting
1https://github.com/keras-team/keras-applications/blob/master/keras applications/vgg16.py
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Table 2: Comparison results on MNIST in Case I.
Privacy Budget Accuracy Parameter Setting
 δ No Privacy DPSGD [1] Bagging σ in DPSGD k in Bagging
0.005 0.005 - 16.41% 90.66% 200 300
0.0083 0.0083 - 19.76% 93.81% 150 500
0.017 0.017 - 39.73% 94.60% 100 1000
0.083 0.08 - 87.91% 97.68% 19 5000
0.167 0.154 - 91.95% 98.28% 8 10000
- - 99.1% - - - -
in Case I and Case II. For PATE [17], we set the number of teachers to be 250, and both
teacher and student models are trained for 1,000 epochs. Bagging, DPSGD, and PATE have
different ways to control  and δ. Next, we describe how to set their parameters to achieve a
target level of  and δ.
• Bagging. Given the training dataset size n and subsample size k, we can calculate the
privacy budget (, δ) of Bagging based on Table 1.
• DPSGD [1]. We vary the standard deviation σ of the Gaussian noise used by DPSGD
to achieve a target level of  and δ.
• PATE [17]. For PATE with the Confident-GNMax aggregation mechanism [17], threshold
T and noise parameter σ1 are used for privately checking consensus of the teachers’ pre-
dictions. Gaussian noise standard deviation σ2 is used for the usual max-of-Gaussian [17].
Following the authors of PATE, we set T= 200, σ1 = 150, and σ2 = 40. We then vary
the number of queries answered by the Confident-GNMax aggregator to achieve a target
privacy budget  and δ. We found that PATE cannot reach the small  we set for Bagging
and DPSGD, so we relax its  to be around 1, which is much larger than the  used by
Bagging and DPSGD. In other words, we give additional advantages for PATE.
4.2 Experimental Results
We first compare Bagging with DPSGD and PATE. Then, we evaluate different variants of
Bagging.
Comparison results in Case I: Table 2 and 3 show the testing accuracies of DPSGD and
Bagging (with replacement and N = 1) for different privacy budgets in Case I on MNIST
and CIFAR10, respectively. The column “No Privacy” corresponds to models without privacy
guarantees. First, we observe that Bagging achieves significantly higher testing accuracies than
DPSGD under the same privacy budget. Second, increasing the subsample size k in Bagging
is equivalent to decreasing the Gaussian noise scale in DPSGD, which provides weaker privacy
guarantees and trains models with higher accuracies.
Comparison results in Case II: Table 4 and 5 respectively show the testing accuracies of
DPSGD, PATE, and Bagging for different privacy budgets in Case II on MNIST and CIFAR10,
respectively. We have two observations. First, Bagging achieves significantly higher testing
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Table 3: Comparison results on CIFAR10 in Case I.
Privacy Budget Accuracy Parameter Setting
 δ No Privacy DPSGD [1] Bagging σ in DPSGD k in Bagging
0.02 0.02 - 12.74% 41.63% 72 1000
0.1 0.095 - 15.78% 59.76% 11.5 5000
0.2 0.181 - 27.86% 65.25% 4.9 10000
0.4 0.33 - 40.96% 70.75% 2.18 20000
0.6 0.45 - 46.53% 73.95% 1.4 30000
- - 80.82% - - - -
Table 4: Comparison results on MNIST in Case II.
Method  δ Accuracy Parameter Setting
No Privacy - - 98.83% -
DPSGD [1] 0.008 0.008 11.17% σ=150
PATE [17] 0.57 0.008 74.37% Quiries Answered by Aggregator= 100
Bagging 0.008 0.008 90.20% k = 500
DPSGD [1] 0.017 0.017 14.46% σ=100
PATE [17] 0.66 0.017 78.42% Quiries Answered by Aggregator = 150
Bagging 0.017 0.017 93.59% k = 1000
DPSGD [1] 0.08 0.08 81.43% σ=19
PATE [17] 0.63 0.08 83.31% Quiries Answered by Aggregator = 180
Bagging 0.08 0.08 96.87% k = 5000
accuracies than DPSGD and PATE, even if PATE has weaker privacy guarantees. Second, via
comparing Table 3 and Table 5, we observe that Bagging achieves better accuracies in Case
II than Case I for CIFAR10 when the public non-sensitive dataset is ImageNet, which means
that transferring knowledge from a public non-sensitive dataset does improve accuracy of the
model trained on the sensitive training dataset. DPSGD also achieves higher accuracies in
Case II for CIFAR10 when the privacy budgets are larger than some threshold (e.g., 0.02).
However, we didn’t observe such accuracy improvement for MNIST in Case II when the public
non-sensitive dataset is Fashion-MNIST. In fact, based on Table 2 and 4, testing accuracies of
DPSGD and Bagging may even decrease in Case II. We suspect the reason may be that the
pretrained model for Fashion-MNIST is much simpler than that for ImageNet, which does not
extract meaningful features.
Impact of k and N on Bagging: Figure 1 shows the testing accuracy of Bagging in Case
II as we train more base models. We fix N · k in each curve in the graphs, so each curve has
the same privacy budget independent of the number of base models. We observe that, given
the same privacy budget, Bagging has lower accuracies when training more base models. The
reason is that, given the same privacy budget, training more base models means that each base
model is trained using less examples and thus less accurate.
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Table 5: Comparison results on CIFAR10 in Case II.
Method  δ Accuracy Parameter Setting
No Privacy - - 87.90% -
DPSGD [1] 0.02 0.02 11.97% σ=72
PATE [17] 1.12 0.02 37.8% Quiries Answered by Aggregator = 100
Bagging 0.02 0.02 62.22% k = 1000
DPSGD [1] 0.1 0.095 21.08% σ=11.5
PATE [17] 1.02 0.095 40.86% Quiries Answered by Aggregator= 130
Bagging 0.1 0.095 75.67% k = 5000
DPSGD [1] 0.2 0.18 30.63% σ=4.9
PATE [17] 1.03 0.18 42.55% Quiries Answered by Aggregator = 170
Bagging 0.2 0.18 79.55% k = 10000
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Figure 1: Testing accuracy of Bagging when training N base models, where the
privacy budget N · k is fixed.
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Figure 2: Bagging with replacement vs. Bagging without replacement.
Bagging with vs. without replacement: Figure 2 shows the testing accuracy of Bagging
with vs. without replacement in Case II as we vary the subsample size k, where N = 1.
The same subsample size k has very close privacy budgets (, δ) for Bagging with and without
replacement, according to Table 1. Our results show that with or without replacement has
negligible impact on Bagging.
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5 Conclusion
In this work, we study the intrinsic (, δ)-differential privacy of Bagging. Our major theoretical
results show that Bagging’s intrinsic randomness from subsampling already makes Bagging
differentially private without the needs of additional noise. We derive the (, δ)-differential
privacy guarantees for Bagging with and without replacement. Moreover, we prove that if no
assumptions about the base learner are made, our derived privacy guarantees are tight. We
empirically evaluate Bagging on MNIST and CIFAR10. Our experimental results demonstrate
that Bagging achieves significantly higher accuracies than state-of-the-art differentially private
machine learning methods with the same privacy budget.
References
[1] Martin Abadi, Andy Chu, Ian Goodfellow, H Brendan McMahan, Ilya Mironov, Kunal
Talwar, and Li Zhang. Deep learning with differential privacy. In Proceedings of the 2016
ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pages 308–318,
2016.
[2] Raef Bassily, Adam Smith, and Abhradeep Thakurta. Private empirical risk minimization:
Efficient algorithms and tight error bounds. In 2014 IEEE 55th Annual Symposium on
Foundations of Computer Science, pages 464–473. IEEE, 2014.
[3] Leo Breiman. Bagging predictors. Machine learning, 24(2):123–140, 1996.
[4] Kamalika Chaudhuri, Claire Monteleoni, and Anand D Sarwate. Differentially private
empirical risk minimization. Journal of Machine Learning Research, 12(Mar):1069–1109,
2011.
[5] Jia Deng, Wei Dong, Richard Socher, Li-Jia Li, Kai Li, and Li Fei-Fei. Imagenet: A
large-scale hierarchical image database. In 2009 IEEE conference on computer vision and
pattern recognition, pages 248–255. Ieee, 2009.
[6] Thomas G Dietterich. Ensemble methods in machine learning. In International workshop
on multiple classifier systems, pages 1–15. Springer, 2000.
[7] Cynthia Dwork and Aaron Roth. The algorithmic foundations of differential privacy.
Foundations and Trends R© in Theoretical Computer Science, 9(3–4):211–407, 2014.
[8] Matt Fredrikson, Somesh Jha, and Thomas Ristenpart. Model inversion attacks that
exploit confidence information and basic countermeasures. In CCS, 2015.
[9] Ian Goodfellow, Jean Pouget-Abadie, Mehdi Mirza, Bing Xu, David Warde-Farley, Sherjil
Ozair, Aaron Courville, and Yoshua Bengio. Generative adversarial nets. In Advances in
neural information processing systems, pages 2672–2680, 2014.
[10] Jihun Hamm, Yingjun Cao, and Mikhail Belkin. Learning privately from multiparty data.
In International Conference on Machine Learning, pages 555–563, 2016.
[11] James Jordon, Jinsung Yoon, and Mihaela van der Schaar. Pate-gan: Generating synthetic
data with differential privacy guarantees. 2018.
11
[12] James Jordon, Jinsung Yoon, and Mihaela van der Schaar. Differentially private bagging:
Improved utility and cheaper privacy than subsample-and-aggregate. In Advances in
Neural Information Processing Systems, pages 4325–4334, 2019.
[13] Daniel Kifer, Adam Smith, and Abhradeep Thakurta. Private convex empirical risk mini-
mization and high-dimensional regression. In Conference on Learning Theory, pages 25–1,
2012.
[14] Alex Krizhevsky, Geoffrey Hinton, et al. Learning multiple layers of features from tiny
images. 2009.
[15] Yann LeCun, Corinna Cortes, and CJ Burges. Mnist handwritten digit database. 2010.
[16] Nicolas Papernot, Mart´ın Abadi, Ulfar Erlingsson, Ian Goodfellow, and Kunal Talwar.
Semi-supervised knowledge transfer for deep learning from private training data. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1610.05755, 2016.
[17] Nicolas Papernot, Shuang Song, Ilya Mironov, Ananth Raghunathan, Kunal Talwar, and
U´lfar Erlingsson. Scalable private learning with pate. arXiv preprint arXiv:1802.08908,
2018.
[18] Reza Shokri, Marco Stronati, Congzheng Song, and Vitaly Shmatikov. Membership in-
ference attacks against machine learning models. In 2017 IEEE Symposium on Security
and Privacy (SP), pages 3–18. IEEE, 2017.
[19] Karen Simonyan and Andrew Zisserman. Very deep convolutional networks for large-scale
image recognition. arXiv preprint arXiv:1409.1556, 2014.
[20] Shuang Song, Kamalika Chaudhuri, and Anand D Sarwate. Stochastic gradient descent
with differentially private updates. In 2013 IEEE Global Conference on Signal and Infor-
mation Processing, pages 245–248. IEEE, 2013.
[21] Paul Voigt and Axel Von dem Bussche. The eu general data protection regulation (gdpr).
A Practical Guide, 1st Ed., Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2017.
[22] Di Wang, Minwei Ye, and Jinhui Xu. Differentially private empirical risk minimization
revisited: Faster and more general. In Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems,
pages 2722–2731, 2017.
[23] Han Xiao, Kashif Rasul, and Roland Vollgraf. Fashion-mnist: a novel image dataset for
benchmarking machine learning algorithms. arXiv preprint arXiv:1708.07747, 2017.
[24] Liyang Xie, Kaixiang Lin, Shu Wang, Fei Wang, and Jiayu Zhou. Differentially private
generative adversarial network. arXiv preprint arXiv:1802.06739, 2018.
12
A Proof of Theorem 2
We first show the process of subsampling in Bagging with replacement achieves (k · ln n+1n , 1−
(n−1n )
k)-differential privacy. Then we can view Bagging’s training of the base model as post-
processing of subsampling so that Bagging with replacement achieves (k · ln n+1n , 1− (n−1n )k)-
differential privacy.
For simplicity, we use operator b to denote the subsampling operation of Bagging with
replacement. In particular, given the training dataset D and its adjacent dataset D′, b(D)
and b(D′) denote a subsample of k examples sampled from D and D′ uniformly at random
with replacement, respectively. We use Φ to denote the joint domain of b(D) and b(D′).
Specifically, each element φ ∈ Φ is a subsample of k examples. Given b(D) and b(D′), we
denote the following three subsets of domain Φ:
Γ1 = {φ ∈ Φ|Pr(b(D) = φ) > 0,Pr(b(D′) = φ) = 0}, (2)
Γ2 = {φ ∈ Φ|Pr(b(D) = φ) = 0,Pr(b(D′) = φ) > 0}, (3)
Γ3 = {φ ∈ Φ|Pr(b(D) = φ) > 0,Pr(b(D′) = φ) > 0}. (4)
Intuitively, Γ1 includes all subsamples that can only be derived from D. Γ2 includes all
subsamples that can only be derived from D′. Γ3 includes all subsamples that can be derived
from D and D′. We note that Γ1 ∪ Γ2 ∪ Γ3 constitutes all possible subsamples of b(D) and
b(D′). Since D′ is an adjacent dataset of D and D has size n, D′ has size n±1. For simplicity,
we use |D| and |D′| to denote the size of D and D′, respectively. Note that there is just one
example which is different between D and D′. Therefore, we have the following:
|D ∩D′| = n− 1, if |D′| = n− 1, (5)
|D ∩D′| = n, if |D′| = n+ 1. (6)
In other words, the number of overlapping examples between D and D′ are n − 1 and n
when the size of D′ is n− 1 and n+ 1, respectively. Since Bagging with replacement randomly
samples k training examples uniformly at random with replacement, we have the following:
Pr(b(D) = φ) =
{
1
(|D|)k , if φ ∈ Γ1 ∪ Γ3,
0, otherwise.
(7)
Pr(b(D′) = φ) =
{
1
(|D′|)k , if φ ∈ Γ2 ∪ Γ3,
0, otherwise.
(8)
Moreover, the number of elements in Γ1, Γ2, and Γ3 can be computed as |D|k − |D ∩D′|k,
|D′|k−|D∩D′|k, and |D∩D′|k, respectively. Given the probability density and the size of Γ1,
Γ2, and Γ3, we have the following:
Pr(b(D) ∈ Γ3) =
( | D ∩D′ |
| D |
)k
,Pr(b(D) ∈ Γ1) = 1−
( | D ∩D′ |
| D |
)k
and Pr(b(D) ∈ Γ2) = 0,
(9)
Pr(b(D′) ∈ Γ3) =
( | D ∩D′ |
| D′ |
)k
,Pr(b(D′) ∈ Γ2) = 1−
( | D ∩D′ |
| D′ |
)k
and Pr(b(D′) ∈ Γ1) = 0.
(10)
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Recall our goal is to show Bagging with replacement achieves (, δ)-differential privacy. We
will first find a δ and then determine the value of  for the given δ. In particular, for any
∆ ⊆ Γ1 and |D′| = n− 1, we have the following:
Pr(b(D) ∈ ∆) ≤ Pr(b(D) ∈ Γ1) = 1−
(
n− 1
n
)k
and Pr(b(D′) ∈ ∆) = 0. (11)
In other words, we have the following:
∀∆ ⊆ Γ1,Pr(b(D) ∈ ∆) ≤ e · 0 + 1−
(
n− 1
n
)k
= e · Pr(b(D′) ∈ ∆) +
(
1−
(
n− 1
n
)k)
.
(12)
Therefore, we let δ = 1 − (n−1n )k. Next, we prove that for ∀∆ ⊆ Φ, i.e., ∆ is an arbitrary
subset of Φ, we have the following:
Pr(b(D) ∈ ∆) ≤
(
n+ 1
n
)k
· Pr(b(D′) ∈ ∆) +
(
1−
(
n− 1
n
)k)
. (13)
We decompose ∆ into three disjoint subsets, i.e., ∆ = ∆1 ∪ ∆2 ∪ ∆3, where ∆1 ⊆ Γ1,
∆2 ⊆ Γ2, and ∆3 ⊆ Γ3. We first consider |D′| = n+ 1. Then, we have the following:
Pr(b(D) ∈ ∆) (14)
=Pr(b(D) ∈ ∆1) + Pr(b(D) ∈ ∆2) + Pr(b(D) ∈ ∆3) (15)
=Pr(b(D) ∈ ∆3) (16)
=Pr(b(D′) ∈ ∆3) · |D
′|k
|D|k (17)
=Pr(b(D′) ∈ ∆3) ·
(
n+ 1
n
)k
(18)
≤Pr(b(D′) ∈ ∆) ·
(
n+ 1
n
)k
+
(
1−
(
n− 1
n
)k)
. (19)
Similarly, when |D′| = n− 1, we have the following:
Pr(b(D) ∈ ∆) (20)
=Pr(b(D) ∈ ∆1) + Pr(b(D) ∈ ∆2) + Pr(b(D) ∈ ∆3) (21)
=Pr(b(D) ∈ ∆3) + Pr(b(D) ∈ ∆1) (22)
≤Pr(b(D) ∈ ∆3) +
(
1−
(
n− 1
n
)k)
(23)
=Pr(b(D′) ∈ ∆3) · |D
′|k
|D|k +
(
1−
(
n− 1
n
)k)
(24)
=Pr(b(D′) ∈ ∆3) ·
(
n− 1
n
)k
+
(
1−
(
n− 1
n
)k)
(25)
≤Pr(b(D′) ∈ ∆) ·
(
n− 1
n
)k
+
(
1−
(
n− 1
n
)k)
. (26)
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Since we have (n−1n )
k ≤ (n+1n )k, we have the following when |D′| = n± 1:
∀∆ ∈ Φ,Pr(b(D) ∈ ∆) ≤ Pr(b(D′) ∈ ∆) ·
(
n+ 1
n
)k
+
(
1−
(
n− 1
n
)k)
. (27)
We let e = (n+1n )
k. Then, we have  = k · ln n+1n . Therefore, we show b(D) achieves
(k · ln n+1n , 1 − (n−1n )k)-differential privacy. We can view the training of the base model as
post-processing of b(D), which does not alter the privacy level according to Proposition 1.
Therefore, Bagging with replacement achieves
(
k · ln n+1n , 1− (n−1n )k
)
-differential privacy.
B Proof of Theorem 4
We show Bagging without replacement achieves
(
ln n+1n+1−k·N ,
k·N
n
)
-differential privacy when
training N models with N ·k examples. We first show the proof for N = 1, and then generalize
it to arbitrary N . We reuse some notations defined in the proof of Theorem 2 for simplicity.
We use operator a to denote the sampling operation of Bagging without replacement. We
use Ψ to denote the joint domain of a(D) and a(D′). Specifically, each element ψ ∈ Ψ is a
subsample of k examples. Given a(D) and a(D′), we denote the following three subsets of
domain Ψ:
Λ1 = {ψ ∈ Ψ|Pr(a(D) = ψ) > 0,Pr(a(D′) = ψ) = 0}, (28)
Λ2 = {ψ ∈ Ψ|Pr(a(D) = ψ) = 0,Pr(a(D′) = ψ) > 0}, (29)
Λ3 = {ψ ∈ Ψ|Pr(a(D) = ψ) > 0,Pr(a(D′) = ψ) > 0}. (30)
Intuitively, Λ1 includes all subsamples that can only be derived from D. Λ2 includes all
subsamples that can only be derived from D′. Λ3 includes all subsamples that can be derived
from both D and D′. We note that Λ1 ∪ Λ2 ∪ Λ3 constitutes all possible subsamples of a(D)
and a(D′). Since we consider Bagging without replacement, we have the following:
Pr(a(D) = ψ) =

1
(|D|k )
, if ψ ∈ Λ1 ∪ Λ3,
0, otherwise.
(31)
Pr(a(D′) = ψ) =

1
(|D
′|
k )
, if ψ ∈ Λ2 ∪ Λ3,
0, otherwise.
(32)
Moreover, the number of elements in Λ1, Λ2, and Λ3 can be computed as
(|D|
k
)− (|D∩D′|k ),(|D′|
k
) − (|D∩D′|k ), and (|D∩D′|k ), respectively. Given the probability density and the size of Λ1,
Λ2, and Λ3, we have the following:
Pr(a(D) ∈ Λ3) =
(|D∩D′|
k
)(|D|
k
) ,Pr(a(D) ∈ Λ1) = 1− (|D∩D′|k )(|D|
k
) ,Pr(a(D) ∈ Λ2) = 0. (33)
Pr(a(D′) ∈ Λ3) =
(|D∩D′|
k
)(|D′|
k
) ,Pr(a(D′) ∈ Λ2) = 1− (|D∩D′|k )(|D′|
k
) ,Pr(a(D′) ∈ Λ1) = 0. (34)
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Recall our goal is to show Bagging without replacement achieves (, δ)-differential privacy.
We will first find a δ and then determine the value of  for the given δ. In particular, for any
∆ ⊆ Λ1 and |D| = n− 1, we have the following:
Pr(a(D) ∈ ∆) ≤ Pr(a(D) ∈ Λ1) = 1−
(
n−1
k
)(
n
k
) = k
n
,Pr(a(D′) ∈ ∆) = 0. (35)
In other words, we have the following:
∀∆ ⊆ Λ1,Pr(a(D) ∈ ∆) ≤ e · 0 + k
n
= e · Pr(a(D′) ∈ ∆) + k
n
. (36)
Therefore, we let δ = kn . Next, we prove that for ∀∆ ⊆ Ψ, i.e., ∆ is an arbitrary subset of
Ψ, we have the following:
Pr(a(D) ∈ ∆) ≤ n+ 1
n+ 1− k · Pr(a(D
′) ∈ ∆) + k
n
. (37)
We decompose ∆ into three disjoint subsets, i.e., ∆ = ∆1 ∪ ∆2 ∪ ∆3, where ∆1 ⊆ Λ1,
∆2 ⊆ Λ2, and ∆3 ⊆ Λ3. We first consider |D′| = n+ 1. Then, we have the following:
Pr(a(D) ∈ ∆) (38)
=Pr(a(D) ∈ ∆1) + Pr(a(D) ∈ ∆2) + Pr(a(D) ∈ ∆3) (39)
=Pr(a(D) ∈ ∆3) (40)
=Pr(a(D′) ∈ ∆3) ·
(|D′|
k
)(|D|
k
) (41)
=Pr(a(D′) ∈ ∆3) ·
(
n+1
k
)(
n
k
) (42)
≤Pr(a(D′) ∈ ∆3) · n+ 1
n+ 1− k (43)
≤Pr(a(D′) ∈ ∆) · n+ 1
n+ 1− k +
k
n
. (44)
Similarly, when |D′| = n− 1, we have the following:
Pr(a(D) ∈ ∆) (45)
=Pr(a(D) ∈ ∆1) + Pr(a(D) ∈ ∆2) + Pr(a(D) ∈ ∆3) (46)
=Pr(a(D) ∈ ∆3) + Pr(a(D) ∈ ∆1) (47)
≤Pr(a(D) ∈ ∆3) + k
n
(48)
=Pr(a(D′) ∈ ∆3) ·
(|D′|
k
)(|D|
k
) + k
n
(49)
=Pr(a(D′) ∈ ∆3) · n− k
n
+
k
n
(50)
≤Pr(a(D′) ∈ ∆) · n− k
n
+
k
n
. (51)
16
Since we have n−kn ≤ n+1n+1−k , we have the following when |D′| = n± 1:
∀∆ ∈ Ψ,Pr(a(D) ∈ ∆) ≤ Pr(a(D′) ∈ ∆) · n+ 1
n+ 1− k +
k
n
. (52)
We let e = n+1n+1−k . Then, we have  = ln
n+1
n+1−k . Therefore, we show a(D) achieves
(ln n+1n+1−k ,
k
n)-differential privacy. We can view the training of the base model as post-processing
of a(D), which does not alter the privacy level. Therefore, Bagging without replacement
achieves (ln n+1n+1−k ,
k
n)-differential privacy when N = 1. Similarly, when we sample N · k
examples to create a subsample, a(D) achieves (ln n+1n+1−N ·k ,
N ·k
n )-differential privacy. Given
N · k examples, we can evenly divide them into N subsamples, and train N base models
which does not incur extra privacy loss. Therefore, Bagging without replacement achieves
(ln n+1n+1−N ·k ,
N ·k
n )-differential privacy when training N base models.
C Proof of Theorem 5
We show the tightness of our derived (N · k · ln n+1n , 1 − (n−1n )N ·k)-differential privacy for
Bagging with replacement when no assumptions are made on the base learner. Without loss
of generality, we show the proof for N = 1. Specifically, for N > 1, we can use N · k as a new
subsample and obtain the proof for arbitrary N . Our idea is that, for any δ < 1 − (n−1n )k,
we can find a base learner such that Bagging with replacement cannot satisfy (, δ)-differential
privacy for any . For simplicity, we reuse the notations in the proof of Theorem 2. We let
|D′| = n− 1 and ∆′ = Γ1. Then we have the following probabilities:
Pr(b(D) ∈ ∆′) = Pr(b(D) ∈ Γ1) = 1−
( | D ∩D′ |
| D |
)k
= 1−
(
n− 1
n
)k
, (53)
Pr(b(D′) ∈ ∆′) = Pr(b(D′) ∈ Γ1) = 0. (54)
In other words, when δ < 1− (n−1n )k, we have the following:
Pr(b(D) ∈ ∆′) > e · 0 + δ = e · Pr(b(D′) ∈ ∆′) + δ, for any . (55)
Therefore, if the base learner is the k-nearest neighbor algorithm, whose model parameters
are the k training examples in the subsample, Bagging with replacement cannot achieve (, δ)-
differential privacy. Therefore, when no assumptions are made on the base learner, Bagging
with replacement cannot achieve (, δ)-differential privacy when δ < 1− (n−1n )k.
D Proof of Theorem 6
We show the tightness of our derived (ln n+1n+1−N ·k ,
N ·k
n )-differential privacy for Bagging without
replacement when no assumptions are made on the base learner. Without loss of generality,
we show the proof for N = 1. Specifically, for N > 1, we can use N ·k as a new subsample and
obtain the proof for arbitrary N . Our idea is that, for any δ < N ·kn , we can find a base learner
such that Bagging without replacement cannot satisfy (, δ)-differential privacy for any . For
simplicity, we reuse the notations in the proof of Theorem 4. We let |D′| = n−1 and ∆′ = Λ1.
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Then, we have the following probabilities:
Pr(a(D) ∈ ∆′) = Pr(a(D) ∈ Λ1) = 1−
(|D∩D′|
k
)(|D|
k
) = k
n
, (56)
Pr(a(D′) ∈ ∆′) = Pr(a(D′) ∈ Λ1) = 0. (57)
In other words, when δ < kn , we have the following:
Pr(a(D) ∈ ∆′) > e · 0 + δ = e · Pr(b(D′) ∈ ∆) + δ, for any . (58)
Therefore, if the base learner is the k-nearest neighbor algorithm, whose model parameters
are the k training examples in the subsample, Bagging without replacement cannot achieve
(, δ)-differential privacy. Therefore, when no assumptions are made on the base learner, Bag-
ging without replacement cannot achieve (, δ)-differential privacy when δ < kn .
E Model Architecture for MNIST
Table 6: Model architecture of the base classifier for MNIST experiments.
Layer Output Shape
(Input) 28× 28× 1
2D Convolution + ReLU 14× 14× 16
2D MaxPooling 13× 13× 16
2D Convolution + ReLU 5× 5× 32
2D MaxPooling 4× 4× 32
Flatten 512
Fully Connected + ReLU 32
Fully Connected 10
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